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
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## DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL

STUDY TITLE: PROGRAM MANAGER - PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER  
RELATIONSHIP: HOW IT AFFECTS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

STUDY PROBLEM/QUESTION: To examine the working relationship between Program Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers in system acquisition offices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

To evaluate the resultant effect on program management.

## STUDY REPORT ABSTRACT:

The Program Manager (PM) is designated, under DOD 5000.1 as the individual in the Services who is responsible for the management of a system acquisition program. He must depend on a warranted Procuring Contracting Office (PCO) to assist him in the critical steps of fulfilling his program objectives. This report describes the results of a study the attitudes of PMs and PCOs toward each other and their respective roles on major and minor programs.

**KEY WORDS:** MATERIEL ACQUISITION PROCUREMENT PERSONNEL DELPHI TECHNIQUE  
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

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Student, Rank Service

Class

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Clarence Gerald Thompson, Major, USAF,

73-2

November 1973

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# ***DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL***



## **Program Management Course Student Study Program**

PROGRAM MANAGER - PROCURING  
CONTRACTING OFFICER RELATIONSHIP  
HOW IT AFFECTS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT  
STUDY REPORT  
PMC 73-2

Clarence Gerald Thompson  
Major USAF

**Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060**

THOMPSON

PROGRAM MANAGER - PROCURING  
CONTRACTING OFFICER RELATIONSHIP;  
HOW IT AFFECTS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

An Executive Summary  
of a  
Study Report  
by

Clarence Gerald Thompson  
Major USAF

November 1973

Defense Systems Management School  
Program Management Course  
Class 73-2  
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The development and production of major defense systems is accomplished for the Department of Defense by a team of highly skilled specialists under the control of a Program Manager. While the Program Manager has total management responsibility for his program he must depend on a contracting officer to obligate Government funds and complete the necessary interface with private industry.

The authority of the Program Manager is expressed in general terms in DOD Directive 5000.1 and is stated definitively in the Service implementing directives. Although Service directives attempt to clarify the relationship of the PM to the PCO there still exists a potential conflict between them. The purpose of this study is to examine the working relationship between Program Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers in system acquisition offices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to evaluate its effect on program management.

Data for this study was collected through a questionnaire that was mailed to Program Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers in the three services who were selected at random from the official files of the Defense Systems Management School. Seventy-six percent of the Program Managers and ninety-two percent of the Contracting Officers who were original addressees responded to the questionnaire. In compliance with my letter of request some addressees reproduced the questionnaire for completion by other PMs and PCOs to provide me with

additional input.

The responses from both groups indicated that there exists a positive working relationship between PMs and PCOs and this relationship has favorable effect on program management. The two groups were not in complete agreement in their responses to every questions. The PMs felt that they should have some control over the performance rating of the PCO whereas the PCOs generally opposed this. A majority of the PMs felt that with a PCO warrant a PM could manage his program better. Several of the PCOs and PMs were concerned that with such a desire for a successful program a PM might exercise a warrant improperly. They also commented that a PM might lose his overall effectiveness if he had to divide his attention between PM and PCO responsibilities.

The PCOs indicated that Program Managers generally require and possess a high level of procurement knowledge to perform their management function. The PMs likewise rated their PCOs high in terms of skill and professional knowledge. There appears to be a high level of coordination between PMs and PCOs on procurement matters. The PMs also indicated that their procurement functions are generally responsive to their program requirements.

The results of this survey indicate that the majority of PMs and PCOs see no great conflict in their roles and they feel that PCO authority is not excessive in comparison to that of the program manager.



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PROGRAM MANAGER - PROCURING  
CONTRACTING OFFICER RELATIONSHIP;  
HOW IT AFFECTS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT  
STUDY REPORT

Presented to the Faculty  
of the  
Defense Systems Management School  
in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Program Management Course  
Class 73-2

by

Clarence Gerald Thompson  
Major USAF

PROGRAM MANAGER - PROCURING  
CONTRACTING OFFICER RELATIONSHIP;  
HOW IT AFFECTS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The acquisition of a major weapon system for the Department of Defense is accomplished by a team of highly skilled people. The head of this team is the Program Manager whose effectiveness is largely dependent on the working relationship he can maintain with those who support him. The Contracting Officer is a key member of the acquisition team with whom the Program Manager must maintain a positive working relationship.

The Program Manager is primarily dependent upon civilian industry for the ultimate attainment of his programs objectives and the Contracting Officer is the agent of the Government with the authority to formalize the relationship with industry in a contract. In exercising authority in their respective roles the Program Manager (PM) and the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) often find themselves in conflict.

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\*ABSTAINER

This study represents the views, conclusions and recommendations of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Defense Systems Management School nor the Department of Defense.

In DOD Directive 5000.1 the Department of Defense established the PM's authority in broad terms. In their implementing directives, however, the Services specifically stated PM authority with respect to that of the Contracting Officer and clarified their relationship.

In SECNAVINST 5000.1 the Navy stated that the Program Manager has authority to:

Make necessary technical and business management decisions on all matters within the scope of the charter, other than those for which an appropriate Contracting Officer is responsible.<sup>2</sup>

The Department of the Army was somewhat less definitive in expressing PM authority in its implementing directive AR 70-17. The Army states that the PM will:

Approve, consistent with the Armed Services Procurement Regulation and the Army Procurement Procedure, all contractual actions required for the accomplishment of the project.<sup>3</sup>

The Air Force was the least definitive of the Services in expressing the limits to the Program Manager in its directive to implement the DOD acquisition management policy. AFR 300-2 states that the Program Manager:

Makes technical and business management decisions within the approved program to accomplish program objectives. Such decisions will be directive on all participating organizations.<sup>4</sup>

Several active PMs and Senior DOD officials in guest lectures to PMC Class 73-2 at DSMS have indicated a desire to place more procurement authority in the charter of the Program Manager. One of the Services is considering giving their Program Managers a PCO warrant in addition to a charter. Others have placed the Contracting Officer in the program office under the direct control of the PM.

As a warranted Contracting Officer who is about to enter the field of Program Management I am keenly aware of the potential conflict that exists between the two authorities. My purpose in making this study was to examine the working relationship between Program Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers in system acquisition offices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to evaluate the effect on program management.



### RELATED RESEARCH

In the course of researching my topic I discovered two related studies that are concerned with the relationship of the PM to the procurement function. The first of these is a Student Study Paper written by a student at DSMS in Class 73-1. It is entitled "An Evaluation of the Relationship Between DOD Program/Project and Contract Administration Offices."

The purpose of the referenced study was "to evaluate the working relationship between a selected number of Program Management and CAS"<sup>6</sup> (Contract Administration Service Offices). The author believed that the relationship the PM established with a supporting CAS, after contract award, could have a significant impact on his program.

Through a questionnaire he attempted to determine the degree of utilization of the CAS by the Program Managers and the responsiveness of the CAS to PM requests. His questions were in the areas of: (1) the routing of correspondence between the program office, the CAS and the prime contractor; (2) the frequency with which CAS personnel were invited to program review meetings; (3) the delegation of authority to the CAS for the negotiation of contract modifications.

Due to widely varying data inputs, the author could not completely evaluate the working relationship between the PM and the CAS organization but he did propose recommendations for improvements, in selected areas, of the CAS support to the Program Manager.

The second study that I encountered in the course of my research deals in part with a PM - PCO relationship. It was conducted by



Logistics Management Institute, Washington, D. C., pursuant to a DOD contract. This report was published in August 1972.

This study reviewed the management of six major weapon system acquisition programs and the authority and responsibilities of those program managers. The programs studied were F-15, F-14, SAFEGUARD, AX (now designated A-10), S-3A, and Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle. The research was intended to determine the degree of implementation of the new DOD policies directed by DODD 5000.1 and to identify problems arising from their current implementation. The LMI researchers collected data through interviews of program office personnel, a search of pertinent literature, including GAO reports, Congressional Record, etc., and on site review of the six program offices.

The LMI study report reflects some of the attitudes of the program managers toward collocating the contracting officer with the program office. The report also addresses the issue of responsiveness of the functional personnel to the program office and the degree of control, through effectiveness/performance reports, the PM exercised over these specialists.

While the referenced Student Study Paper deals specifically with the relationship of the Program Manager to a contracting function it focuses on the period following the award of a contract. I believe that the more critical period is prior to contract award.

The LMI study covers the broad perspective of the PM's working relationship with all of the functional support organizations and gives a limited coverage to the contracting effort. The LMI findings with

respect to the contracting function are summarized here:

LMI found that program office personnel usually prepare or participate in the preparation of requests for proposals. The Program Managers and some of their key personnel are usually members of Source Selection Evaluation Boards. The Program Managers believe they have satisfactory authority with respect to the contracting function.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to the LMI study my research was intended to measure the attitudes of PMs and PCOs working with each other on both major and minor acquisition programs. If there was a significant conflict between these two elements I intended, through my study, to expose it so that it may be dealt with. If the conflict did not exist I hoped, through my report, to bring this to the attention of those involved in program management.

## DATA COLLECTION

Data for this study was collected through a questionnaire that was mailed to Program Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Program Managers were selected first from an established universe of programs listed in the Official files of the Defense Systems Management School.

The questionnaire was structured so that each respondent was assured of almost complete anonymity. That is, individual and Service Component identification was precluded however, responses of Program Managers were distinguishable from those of the Procuring Contracting Officers. The two categories of questionnaire were separately addressed and included my self-addressed return envelope. Through this method of inquiry I intended to insure the credibility of my data. That is, I hoped to measure the true attitudes of the senior people who are involved in program management.

Programs to be surveyed were classified in both the major and minor categories according to the applicability of DODD 5000.1 and Service Component criteria.

### A. Major programs were:

1. U. S. Air Force - Programs subject to the Program Assessment Review (PAR).
2. U. S. Army - Programs for which a General Officer was authorized as Program Manager.
3. U. S. Navy - Programs for which a Flag Officer was authorized as Program Manager or for which the billet was designated as Command equivalent.

- B. Minor programs were the remainder of the universe of programs that were not designated as major.

	MAJOR	MINOR
Army	10	28
Navy	29	26
Air Force	<u>10</u>	<u>37</u>
TOTAL	49	91

Program selection was accomplished by applying the following decision rules:

- A. Twenty-five major programs were selected by choosing every second program from a list of forty-nine.
- B. Twenty-five minor program officers were selected by choosing every fourth program office plus three at random from a list of ninety-one.
- C. To reach the contracting officers most likely to affect the selected programs, questionnaires were mailed to the senior procurement officer in the offices supporting these programs. This method of contact was chosen to insure independent PCO and PM replies.

Some of the minor program offices were in reality "basket SPOs"; Offices with more than one Program/Project Manager. Likewise, many of the procurement offices were staffed with more than one PCO and some PCOs supported more than one program. In these cases I asked the addressees to have my questionnaire reproduced and completed by appropriate personnel. This was accomplished as evidenced in the high response that I received.

The exact universe of Program/Project Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers cannot be readily determined with the data available at DSMS due to the existence of the "basket SPOs" and the fact that



some PMs are supported by PCOs from functional organizations. I will, therefore, express my findings in terms of percentages of the 38 PMs and 48 PCOs who responded to my questionnaire.

Summary of Questionnaires

PM		PCO
50	Mailed	13
34	Originals Returned	12
76%	Percent Originals Returned	92%
38	Total Returns	48



## ANALYSES

The objectives of this study were to determine how Program Managers and Procuring Contracting Officers involved in system acquisition perceive their working relationship and how this relationship affects program management.

The working relationship:

1. Questions were asked to determine how much control (through performance reporting) each group thought the PM had over the PCO who supported him and what amount of control they thought was necessary. Seventy-two percent of the PMs responded that they had some control, direct or otherwise, over the performance/effectiveness reports of their PCOs. Only twenty-five percent of the PCO responses reflect an awareness of such control. This may indicate that Program Managers have acquired PCO support through more subtle means than direct influence over performance ratings.

Eighty-nine percent of the PMs responded that they should have some control over the rating of the PCOs; forty-two percent of the PCOs concurred. In additional comments both groups stated that this arrangement would make the PCO more responsive to the program. A common reason given by PMs and PCOs who did not concur with such control was that it would destroy a necessary system of checks and balances by subjecting the PCO to direct pressure from the PM. The replies are summarized as follows:

On the program with which I am involved the PM has \_\_\_\_\_ control

over the performance/effectiveness rating of the PCO.

PM	28%	33%	14%	11%	14%
PCO	75%	8%	15%	0%	2%
	NO			FULL	

The Program Manager should have \_\_\_\_\_ control over the performance/effectiveness rating of the PCO.

PM	11%	0%	40%	23%	26%
PCO	56%	16%	16%	4%	8%
	NO			FULL	

2. The following questions were asked to determine if the PMs and PCOs saw an inherent conflict in their respective roles in system acquisition:

The PCO authority is

PM	7%	10%	73%	10%	0%
PCO	0%	4%	52%	24%	20%
	TOO GREAT			TOO LITTLE	

The warrant authority of the PCO and the authority granted the Program Manager in the Charter of Program Management Directive are in:

PM	13%	6%	27%	6%	48%
PCO	12%	4%	20%	20%	44%
	CONFLICT			HARMONY	

These results indicate that the majority of PMs and PCOs see no great conflict in their roles and they feel that PCO authority is not excessive when compared to that of the PM. Comments from both groups indicated that a potential conflict exists but that it is suppressed by the desire of both the PM and the PCO to attain the objectives of the program. Some of the respondents believed that a slight conflict in roles was necessary to restrain the Program Manager. Some respon-

dents, including one PCO, stated that the principle cause of conflict was that the acquisition system was too greatly influenced by the Procurement bureaucracy.

3. The following questions were asked to suggest an alternative means of changing the balance of authority between the PM and the PCO.

With the PCO warrant a Program Manager could negotiate a

PM	17%	14%	39%	19%	11%
PCO	48%	12%	32%	4%	\$
	Worse Contract			Better Contract	

If the Program Manager had PCO authority he could manage his program.

PM	14%	11%	28%	22%	25%
PCO	42%	27%	19%	0%	12%
	Less Effectively			More Effectively	

The results indicate that a high percentage of PM's would prefer to have PCO authority including authority to negotiate their contracts. Those commenting stated that, based on a more intimate knowledge of the program requirements the PM could negotiate a better contract. Many conditioned their responses on the PM having the time and a PCO as staff assistant. Several of the PCOs and PMs believed that the PM would have such a desire to have a successful program that he would negotiate a worse contract.

In the case of overall management of the program most PMs indicated that a warranted Program Manager would have only the interest of his program to consider and could better meet his requirements. One PM disagreed stating, I would "probably be fired if I had PCO authority because the check and balance required for procurement vs. Program

objectives would not exist."

Many of the PCOs felt that even if warranted a PM would still have to comply with all of the regulations, laws, policies and constraints that are applicable to government procurement. Additionally, if the PM had to divide his attention between PM and PCO responsibilities he would lose his overall effectiveness.

4. PCOs were asked to evaluate the level of procurement knowledge of their Program Managers and to express their attitude as to what level is required.

As the result of formal training and/or experience I consider that my Program Manager's knowledge of procurement is

16%	21%	25%	13%	25%
Extensive			Minimal	

To be effective a Program Manager's formal knowledge of procurement should be

30%	17%	48%	5%	0%
Extensive			Minimal	

The PCOs indicate that Program Managers generally require and have a high level of procurement expertise to perform their management function.

In answering these questions several PCOs commented that the more knowledgeable the PM was in the procurement function the more easily he would recognize constraints on the PCO.

5. Program Managers were asked to rate their PCOs in terms of skills and professional knowledge. As a basis for evaluating their responses they were also asked to rate themselves as to procurement



knowledge.

As the result of formal training and/or experience I consider my knowledge of procurement

11%	19%	46%	13%	11%
Extensive			Minimal	

With respect to skill and professional knowledge I would rate my PCO as

50%	34%	8%	8%	0%
Well Qualified			Marginal	

The Program managers in general stated that they were being supported by well qualified PCOs. Some PMs commented that their PCOs were exceptionally well qualified with degrees in engineering and related technical areas. There is a high correlation between responses from PMs and PCOs concerning the procurement knowledge of the Program Managers.

Responses to the following question provides a final measure of the working relationship between PMs and PCOs.

If you had a choice of Program Managers (PCOs) to work with, would you choose the one you have now?

PM	80%	PM	20%
PCO	83%	PCO	17%
	Yes		No

The high percentage of positive responses to this question from both the Program Managers and the PCOs indicates that there is a mutual acceptance of their roles under the current system. This conclusion is supported by the high correlation between their responses concerning the relationship of the PCO warrant to the PM charter. Over eight



percent of both groups stated that they saw no conflict. They also agreed as to the adequacy of the PCO authority although some criticized the procurement bureaucracy. The majority of Program Managers indicated that they could be more effective with a PCO warrant but I interpret this to mean that they want authority over the PCO on their programs. The PCOs in contrast feel that the acquisition system requires the checks and balances permitted by the separation of the functions, therefore, they should not be directly under the control of the Program Manager.

How the PM - PCO relationship affects Program Management.

To achieve effective management of his program the PM must integrate support elements as well as program office elements into a Government team. The PCO, whether located in the Program Office or the functional organization, must support and be responsive to the Program Manager. The PM likewise must support and cooperate with the PCO so that the government may present a single face to the contractor and better attain the program objectives.

The following questions were asked to determine if either group considered the interpretation of procurement directives:

My PCO interprets procurement directives

PM	8%	16%	50%	13%	13%
	Liberal			Conservative	

The Program Managers feels that I interpret procurement directives

PCO	11%	13%	41%	22%	13%
	Liberal			Conservative	

Most of the comments from the Program Managers indicated

that PCO interpretation of directives was realistic and proper. One PM referred to his PCO as, "middle-of-the-road... and we're lucky; most PCOs are ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE." PCO comments reflect a concern that the PMs do not understand delays caused by procurement approvals and reviews.

The following questions were asked to determine the extent to which PMs and PCOs are concerned with functioning as a team and presenting a single face to the contractor:

I solicit comments/recommendations from my PCO in program management decisions that have procurement implications.

(The Program Manager solicits my comments/recommendations)

PM	55%	46%	5%	4%	0%
PCO	53%	45%	12%	10%	0%
	Always				Never

It is important that the Program Officer coordinate official contractor correspondence with the PCO.

PM	88%	12%	0%	0%	0%
PCO	92%	0%	8%	0%	0%
	Strongly Agree				Strongly Disagree

These responses indicate a high level of coordination between the Program Managers and PCOs in a critical program management area. Comments from the PCOs reflected an expected concern over constructive changes and unauthorized obligations.

One Program Manager commented that the PCO should sign all official correspondence to a contractor.

The effectiveness of the Program Manager is largely dependent on the response that he can elicit from his support functions. More than ninety percent of both groups agreed as to the adequacy of response of

the procurement function. The Program Managers and PCOs who did not feel that the procurement function was adequately responsive blamed restrictive regulations as the cause. The results are as follows:

On the following scale please rate the responsiveness of the procurement function to the requirements of the Program Office.

PM	3%	5%	27%	30%	35%
PCO	6%	0%	11%	30%	53%
	Non-Responsive			Highly Responsive	

As a final measure of the current attitudes of the PMs and PCO toward their working relationship they were asked:

The working relationship between the Program Manager and the PCO has a \_\_\_\_\_ effect on the management of this program.

PM	81%	13%	6%	0%	0%
PCO	76%	20%	4%	0%	0%
	Very Positive			Very Negative	

The responses reflect agreement between both groups that a favorable working relationship exists between PMs and PCOs in the Services and this has a positive effect on the management of their current programs. One Program Manager commented, "Without this type of rapport the program suffers." One PCO indicated that a positive relationship existed on his current program but he challenged my inference as to its importance in attaining program objectives. His comment was; "I think this is an area of misconception. I can recall an excellent PM and staff with an excellent PCO... the program was a total failure." Most of the PMs and PCOs agreed, however, that a positive relationship between all of the members of the acquisition team was essential to program success.

## CONCLUSION

The Program Manager is the head of the Government's system acquisition team and has the primary responsibility for the success of his program. The authority of the Program Manager is expressed generally in DODD 5000.1 and is stated definitively in the Service implementing directives. The PM must depend on a number of specialist within the Program Office and from various functional organizations. He is especially dependent upon the Contracting Officer to execute necessary contracts with industry.

The working relationship between the PM and the PCO has been the subject of previous study. LMI found the PMs authority satisfactory with respect to the contracting function. This study, however, was broader in scope and based on a limited sample of six of the major weapon system acquisitions. It was my purpose to survey the opinions of a large percentage the PMs and PCOs of both major and minor programs. The responses from both groups indicated that there exists generally a positive working relationship between PMs and PCOs in the Services and this relationship has a favorable effect on program management. The two groups were not in complete agreement on every question. Eighty-nine percent of the Program Managers indicated that they believe the PM should have some control over PCO performance ratings whereas a majority of PCOs felt they they should be independent of the PM.

A majority of the PMs felt that with a PCO warrant a PM could manage his program better. Several of the PMs and PCOs were concerned, however, that the PM having a strong desire for a successful program,



may exercise a warrant improperly. Additionally, if the PM had to divide his attention between PM and PCO responsibilities he would lose his overall effectiveness.

The PCOs indicate that Program Managers generally require and possess a high level of procurement knowledge to perform their management function. The PMs likewise rated their PCOs high in terms of skill and professional knowledge. There appears to be a high level of coordination between PMs and PCOs on procurement matters and the PMs find the procurement function generally responsive to their program requirements.

The results of this survey indicate that the majority of PMs and PCOs see no great conflict in their roles and they feel that PCO authority is not excessive when compared to that of the Program Manager.

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APPENDIX I

Questionnaire



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL  
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060

SUBJECT: Program Management Course - Student Questionnaire

TO:

1. The Defense Systems Management School requires that each student in the Program Management Course successfully complete a student study program. For my research I have elected to examine the Program Manager (PM) Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) relationship and how it affects the management of a program. I am using the enclosed questionnaire to elicit your opinions of the PM-PCO relationship as it affects your program.
2. As a warranted PCO who is entering the field of Program Management I have more than an academic interest in my study. This study is, however, a graduation requirement and the questionnaire is my only source of data. Your response will be summarized statistically and narratively. No reference will be made to respondents individually or by service component. Please be candid.
3. So that I may receive your data in time to complete my study, request you complete and return the questionnaire by 5 October 1973. I can be reached at DSMS, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (703) 664-2602, Autovon 354-2602. I repeat, my sample size is small so your response is important to the outcome of my study.

CLARENCE G. THOMPSON  
Major, USAF



## QUESTIONNAIRE

Please answer the following questions considering program and procurement activity up to and including contract signing that involve a PCO. Most questions provide for responses on a continuum from 1 to 5, negative to positive, please place an "x" in the square that fits your response. Please add any additional comments in the space provided. No reference will be made to respondents individually or by service component, so please be candid.

The data that you provide in response to this questionnaire will be used to compare the attitudes of PMs and PCOs on a DOD-wide basis and not for comparisons within individual offices. If your office is staffed with more than one PM or PCO, please xerox this questionnaire and ask each to complete it.

Major Clarence G. Thompson

With a PCO warrant a Program Manager could negotiate a

Better Contract					Worse Contract
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Comment:

On the program with which I am involved the PM has \_\_\_\_\_ control over the performance/effectiveness rating of the PCO.

No					Full
----	--	--	--	--	------

Comment:

The Program Manager should have \_\_\_\_\_ control over the performance/effectiveness rating of the PCO.

Full					No
------	--	--	--	--	----

Comment:

It is important that the Program Office coordinate official contractor correspondence with the PCO.

Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree
----------------------	--	--	--	--	-------------------

Comment:

The Program Manager knowingly directly procurement actions that are prohibited by or are contrary to the intent of procurement directives.

Frequently				Never
------------	--	--	--	-------

Comment:

On the following scale please rate the responsiveness of the procurement function to the requirements of the Program Office.

Non Responsive				Highly Responsive
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Comment:

The PCO authority is:

Too great				Too little
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Comment:

If the Program Manager had PCO authority he could manage his program

Less Effectively				More Effectively
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Comment:

The working relationship between the Program Manager and the PCO has a \_\_\_\_\_ effect on the management of this program.

Very Positive					Very Negative
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Comment:

The warrant authority of the PCO and the authority granted the Program Manager in the charter or Program Management Directive are in:

Conflict					Harmony
----------	--	--	--	--	---------

Comment:



My PCO interprets procurement directives

Liberal				Conservative
---------	--	--	--	--------------

Comment:

If you had a choice of PCOs for your program, would you choose the one you have now?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Comment:

I solicit comments/recommendations from my PCO in program management decisions that have procurement implications.

Always				Never
--------	--	--	--	-------

As the result of formal training and/or experience I consider my knowledge of procurement

Extensive				Minimal
-----------	--	--	--	---------

Comment:

With respect to skill and professional knowledge I would rate my PCO as

Marginal				Well Qualified
----------	--	--	--	----------------

Comment:

Please add any comments of your own.

The Program Manager feels that I interpret procurement directives.

Conservatively					Liberal
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Comment:

If you had a choice of Program Managers to work with, would you choose the one you have now?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Comment:

The Program Manager solicits my comments/recommendations in program decisions that have procurement implications.

Never					Always
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Comment:

As the result of formal training and/or experience I consider my Program Manager's knowledge of procurement is:

Extensive					Minimal
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Comment:

To be effective a Program Manager's formal knowledge of procurement should be

Minimal					Extensive
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Comment:

Please add any comments of your own.

APPENDIX II

List of Program Managers

1. Colonel Rufus D. Hutcheson, USAF  
Director  
Combat Grande SPO (ODC)  
Electronic Systems Division  
L. G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts 01730
2. Brigadier General Doward W. Ogden, Jr.  
Project Manager  
DCS (Army) Strategic Communications  
Systems (AMCPM-COM)  
U. S. Army Electronics Command  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703
3. Colonel Robert J. Cottey  
Project Manager  
Remotely Monitored Battlefield  
Sensor System (AMCPM-RBS)  
U. S. Army Electronic Command  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703
4. Colonel Stewart Shirey  
Project Manager  
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (AMCPM-ASE)  
U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command  
St. Louis, Missouri 62166
5. Colonel John P. Dobbins  
Project Manager  
Army Tactical Communications System (AMCPM-ATC)  
U. S. Army Electronics Command  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703
6. Captain Donald Loranger, USN  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA242)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
7. Captain Edward W. Molzan, USN  
Naval Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 383)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
8. Captain Alfred Kurzenhauser, USN  
Naval Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 300)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
9. Colonel Fred M. Kleppsattel, USMC  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 261)  
Washington, D. C. 20361



10. Captain R. S. Donaldson, USN  
Navy Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 253)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
11. Captain Vernon F. Anderson, USN  
Naval Electronic Systems Command  
Headquarters (PME 124)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
12. Captain W. E. Meyer, USN  
Naval Ordnance Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMO 403)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
13. Captain Edward J. Otth, Jr., USN  
Naval Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 399)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
14. Captain Henry A. Hoffman, USN  
Naval Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 396)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
15. Captain Robert J. Eustace, USN  
Navy Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 392)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
16. Captain James T. Burrill, USN  
Naval Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 378)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
17. Captain Edward L. Alderman, USN  
Naval Ship Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMS 302)  
Washington, D. C. 20360
18. Captain James T. Timidaiski, USN  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 260)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
19. Captain G. E. Jessen, USN  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 244)  
Washington, D. C. 20361

20. Captain John R. Farrell, USN  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 240)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
21. Captain Ernest R. Seymour, USN  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 235)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
22. Captain Franklin H. Roth, USN  
Naval Air Systems Command  
Headquarters (PMA 231)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
23. Captain Erving R. McDonald, Jr., USN  
Naval Electronics Systems Command  
Headquarters (PME 107)  
Washington, D. C. 20361
24. Captain Roger M. Boh, Jr., USN  
Ship and Air Systems Integration  
Project (PM15)  
Department of the Navy  
Washington, D. C. 20360
25. Rear Admiral Levering Smith  
Strategic Systems Project Office (PM-1)  
Department of the Navy  
Washington, D. C. 20376
26. Brigadier General Lee D. turner  
Project Manager  
Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft  
System (AMCPM-UA)  
U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command  
St. Louis, Missouri 63166
27. Colonel David H. Souser  
Project Manager  
STINGER (AMCPM-MP)  
U. S. Army Missile Command  
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809
28. Colonel John M. Shea  
Project Manager  
Dragon (AMCPM-MW)  
U. S. Army Missile Command  
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809

29. Colonel George R. Relyea  
Product Manager, Family of  
Military Engineering Construction  
and Universal Engineering Tractor (AMCPM-FM)  
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060
30. Colonel Frank P. Ragane  
Project Manager  
2.75 Rocket System (AMCPM-RK)  
U. S. Army Missile Command  
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809
31. Colonel James F. McCluskey  
Project Manager, Mechanized Infantry  
Combat Vehicle (AMCPM-MICV)  
U. S. Army Tank-Automotive Command  
Warren, Michigan 48090
32. Brigadier General Jerry B. Saver  
Project Manager  
Heavy Lift Helicopter (AMCPM-HLH)  
U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command  
St. Louis, Missouri 62166
33. Brigadier General Joseph C. Fimiani  
Project Manager  
SAM-D (AMCPM-MD)  
U. S. Army Missile Command  
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809
34. Brigadier General Albert B. Crawford, Jr.  
Project Manager  
Army Tactical Data Systems (AMCPM-TDS)  
U. S. Army Electronics Command  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703
35. Brigadier General Robert J. Baer  
Project Manager  
XM-1 Tank System (AMCPM-CGM)  
U. S. Army Tank-Automotive Command  
Warren, Michigan 48090
36. Brigadier General Lyle W. Cameron, USAF  
Director  
Advanced Airborne Command Post SPO (MC)  
Electronic Systems Division  
L. G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts 01730

37. Colonel Howard M. Estes, Jr., USAF  
Deputy  
Re-Entry Systems (TX)  
Space and Missile Systems Organization  
P.O. Box 92960, Worldway Postal Center  
Los Angeles, California 90045
38. Colonel E. A. Coy, USAF  
Deputy  
Space Communications Systems (TZ)  
Space and Missile Systems Organization  
P.O. Box 92960, Worldway Postal Center  
Los Angeles, California 90045
39. Mr. M. F. Anderson  
Project Manager  
436M SEEDCUPS (MC)  
Electronic Systems Division  
L. G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts 01730
40. Brigadier General J. F. Albert, USAF  
Deputy, Space Defense System (TW)  
Space and Missile Systems Organization  
P.O. Box 92960, Worldway Postal Center  
Los Angeles, California 90045
41. Colonel Melvin F. Chubb, Jr., USAF  
Director  
AGM-65 System Program Office (SO 65)  
Aeronautical Systems Division  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45453
42. Colonel J. R. Brill, USAF  
Director  
AGM-86 Program Office (RW 86)  
Aeronautical Systems Division  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45453
43. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Stout, USAF  
Program Manager  
HAST (DLQ)  
Armament Development Test Center  
Elgin AFB, Florida 32542
44. Mr. Paul Rosen  
Program Manager  
Lincoln Experimental Satellite  
Lincoln Laboratory  
L. G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts 07130



45. Colonel D. W. Lambrecht, USAF  
Director  
Over-The-Horizon SPO (OCH)  
Electronic Systems Division  
L. G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts 01730
46. Colonel Lloyd H. Giesy, USAF  
Director  
DOD/AIMS/TRACALS SPO (DCT)  
Electronic Systems Division  
L. G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts 01730
47. Lieutenant Colonel John V. Kleperis  
Program Manager  
Pave Spike (RWRA)  
Aeronautical Systems Division  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45453
48. Major General B. N. Bellis, USAF  
Deputy for F-15/JEPO (YF)  
Aeronautical Systems Division  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45453
49. Brigadier General Thomas H. McMullen, USAF  
Deputy  
A-10 System Program Office (SDX).  
Aeronautical Systems Division  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433
50. Lieutenant Colonel Ross H. Rogers, USAF  
Program Manager  
F-40 Wild Weasel (RWET)  
Aeronautical Systems Division  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433

APPENDIX III

List of Procurement Directorates

1. Aeronautical Systems Division  
ASD/PP  
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433
2. Space and Missile Systems Organization  
SAMSO/PP  
Air Force Unit Post Office  
Los Angeles, CA 90045
3. Armament Development Test Center  
ADTC/PP  
Elgin AFB, FL 32542
4. Automatic Data Processing Equipment  
Selection Office (ADPESO)  
Department of the Navy  
Washington, D. C. 20390
5. Electronic Systems Division  
Deputy for Command and Management Systems (MCP)  
L. G. Hanscom Field, MA 01730
6. Electronic Systems Division  
Directorate of ADPE Selection (MCSP)  
L. G. Hanscom Field, MA 01730
7. U. S. Army Electronic Command  
Directorate of Production and Procurement  
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703
8. U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command  
Directorate of Production and Procurement  
P.O. Box 209  
St. Louis, MO 63102
9. Naval Air Systems Command  
Directorate of Procurement  
Washington, D. C. 20360
10. Naval Ship Systems Command HQ  
Navy Department, Director of Procurement  
Washington, D. C. 20390
11. Naval Electronics Systems Command, HQ  
Director of Procurement  
Washington, D. C. 20360
12. U. S. Army Missile Command  
Directorate of Production and Procurement  
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809

13. U. S. Army Tank-Automotive Command  
Directorate of Production and Procurement  
Warren, Michigan 48090